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on a development strategy for Africa
(2005/2142(INI))

Committee on Development

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MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on a development strategy for Africa (2005/2142(INI))

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the Millennium Declaration of 8 September 2000, which sets out the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as criteria established jointly by the international community for the elimination of poverty,
- having regard to the successive Human Development Reports drawn up by the United Nations Development Programme,
- having regard to the report by the UN Millennium Project Task Force headed by Professor Jeffrey Sachs: "Investing in Development: a practical plan to achieve the Millennium Development Goals",
- having regard to the March 2005 report of the Commission for Africa: "Our Common Interest",
- having regard to the 2004-2007 Strategic Plan of the Commission of the African Union, adopted on 7 July 2004 at the third Summit of African Heads of State and Government in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,
- having regard to the African leaders' October 2001 document: "The New Partnership for Africa's Development" (NEPAD), which was declared a programme of the African Union at the first Summit of that organization,
- having regard to the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD),
- having regard to the European Programme for Action to Confront HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis through external action (2007-2011) (COM(2005)0179),
- having regard to the Coherent Policy Framework for External Action to Confront HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis,
- having regard to the Economic Report on Africa 2004: "Unlocking Africa's Trade Potential" by the UN Economic Commission for Africa,
- having regard to G8 Africa Action Plan, released on 27 June 2002 by the Group of Eight in Kananaskis,
- having regard to the Progress Report by the G8 Africa Personal Representatives on implementation of the Africa Action Plan, released on 1 July 2005 by the Group of Eight in London,
- having regard to the Gleneagles Communiqué, released on 8 July 2005 by the Group of Eight in Gleneagles,

- having regard to the European Commission Report of 29 October 2004 on the Millennium Development Goals 2000-2004 (SEC(2004)1379),
- having regard to the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee of 12 April 2005: “Speeding up progress towards the Millennium Development Goals - The European Union’s contribution” (COM(2005)0132),
- having regard to the Statement by the Council and the Commission on the European Community's development policy of 10 November 2000 (currently under revision),
- having regard to the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 13 July 2005 entitled “Proposal for a Joint Declaration by the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on the European Union Development Policy – “The European Consensus” (COM(2005)0311),
- having regard to the Conclusions of the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) of 22-23 November 2004 and of 23-24 May 2005, and the conclusions of the European Council of 16-17 June 2005,
- having regard to the successive UNCTAD reports on Economic Development in Africa,
- having regard to the action plan drawn up at the Africa-Europe Summit held in Cairo on 3-4 April 2000 under the aegis of the Organisation for African Unity and the European Union,
- having regard to the EU-US Declaration entitled "Working Together to Promote Peace, Stability, Prosperity, and Good Governance in Africa" of 20 June 2005,
- having regard to the document: “Why we need to work more effectively in fragile states”, published in January 2005 by the UK Department for International Development,
- having regard to the study: “Ending Africa’s Poverty Trap”¹,
- having regard to Articles 177 to 181 of the Treaty establishing the European Community,
- having regard to its resolutions of 26 October 2000 on the Commission communication to the Council and the European Parliament on cooperation with ACP countries involved in armed conflicts², of 25 April 2002 on the financing of development aid³, of 3 September 2002 on trade and development for poverty eradication⁴, of 15 May 2003 on capacity-building in the developing countries⁵, of 15 May 2003 on the Commission communication to the Council and the European Parliament on education and training in the context of

¹ Sachs, J. et al.: “Ending Africa’s Poverty Trap”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2004 (1), p. 117 - 240.

² OJ C 197, 12.7.2001, p. 390.

³ OJ C 131 E, 5.6.2003, p. 164.

⁴ OJ C 272 E, 13.11.2003, p. 277.

⁵ OJ C 67 E, 17.3.2004, p. 255.

poverty reduction in developing countries¹, of 3 June 2003 on the implementation of macro-financial assistance to third countries², of 14 January 2004 on the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)³, of 31 March 2004 on Governance in the European Union's development policy⁴, of 13 January 2005 on debt relief for developing countries⁵, of 24 February 2005 on action against hunger and poverty⁶, of 24 February 2005 on the Commission's legislative and work programme for 2005⁷, of 28 April 2005 on the Annual Report on Human Rights in the World 2004 and the EU's policy on the matter⁸, of 6 July 2005 on the Global Call to Action: Making Poverty History⁹,

- having regard to Rule 45 of its Rules of Procedure,
 - having regard to the report of the Committee on Development and the opinions of the Committee on International Trade and the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A6-0318/2005),
- A. Whereas the EU has committed itself to increase its level of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to 0.7 % of GDP by 2015 (0.56 % by 2010), and to allocate at least 50 % of the increase to sub-Saharan Africa; whereas the increase must go hand in hand with improved quality, effectiveness, transparency and visibility of aid,
- B. Whereas the EU is by far the largest donor in Africa, but is lacking the necessary leadership and vision to build a coherent approach,
- C. Whereas, in order to promote sustainable development, African governments themselves bear the primary responsibility for good governance, the fight against corruption, and investment in poverty reduction in their countries; whereas the principle of African ownership is therefore essential in EU-Africa relations, but needs a different approach in well-performing and in fragile states,
- D. Whereas the third Summit of African Heads of State and Government of the African Union has adopted a Strategic Plan, defining 23 priority programmes to be carried out between 2004 and 2007, which constitute a comprehensive roadmap for achieving economic growth and development on the continent, covering also civil society and the continent's ties with the international community in tackling poverty, disease, unemployment and illiteracy in Africa,
- E. Considering that the Commission has launched a process of consultation with African organisations around its proposed Africa strategy, but regretting that this consultation has not been extended to the ACP group or to African civil society,
- F. Considering that in March 2005 the Economic, Social and Cultural Council of the African

¹ OJ C 67 E, 17.3.2004, p. 285.

² OJ C 68 E, 18.3.2004, p. 86.

³ OJ C 92 E, 16.4.2004, p. 315.

⁴ OJ C 103 E, 29.4.2004, p. 550.

⁵ Texts Adopted, P6_TA(2005)0008.

⁶ Texts Adopted, P6_TA(2005)0052.

⁷ Texts Adopted, P6_TA(2005)0053.

⁸ Texts Adopted, P6_TA(2005)0150.

⁹ Texts Adopted, P6_TA(2005)0289.

Union (ECOSOCC) was launched, with a General Assembly representing 150 African Civil Society Organizations at national and regional level and representing also the African diaspora,

- G. Whereas poverty reduction through the achievement of the MDGs must be the cornerstone of EU development policy, and hence of an EU Strategy for Africa, also in the areas of peace and security and economic empowerment,
- H. Whereas poverty reduction strategies in Africa must address the many complex causes of poverty, some of which have to do with internal African situations, others with the way in which the international donor community functions; considering, therefore, that the new Africa strategy should address the causes of poverty, prioritizing national efforts to eradicate poverty as part of an organised and coordinated international approach,
- I. Whereas the costs of gender discrimination are highest for low-income countries as women are at the heart of development, caring for and supporting their families and playing a central role in rural economies and food production, but often have no access to education, basic health care, particularly reproductive health care, the economic system and property rights,
- J. Whereas the effectiveness of EU development aid depends to a large extent on coordination and leadership in different policy areas, regions and countries, both between Member States and the Commission and between Member States themselves, and on greater coherence between other EU policy areas and development policy,
- K. Whereas the Cotonou Agreement is an ongoing long-term cooperation, with a framework offering a broad range of principles, policies and instruments for poverty eradication,
- L. Whereas an Africa strategy should be geared towards economic progress for the whole continent, but the majority of African states are fragile and suffer from structural instability and will therefore neither attract investment nor develop a private sector, and whereas that Africa strategy should have a special approach to the needs of fragile states in order to avoid their further lapsing into poverty and violence and consequently destabilising their neighbours,
- M. Whereas many African countries find it difficult to absorb critical developmental aid in fields such as education, health, public management and administration; whereas there is, therefore, a need for good and effective governance, corruption eradication and effective human resource training,
- N. Whereas most African countries spend more on servicing debt than on basic social services; whereas, however, debt relief alone is not a panacea and does not in itself create resources, reduce poverty or promote development,
- O. Whereas there is a large diversity of African cultures and whereas development cannot be realised without a proper understanding of the cultures, including the role of religious and ethnic communities,
- P. Whereas in most African countries, the dialogue between governmental authorities and

civil society remains difficult, thereby hindering the process of democratisation,

- Q. Whereas, in order to be credible, accountable and transparent, the Strategy for Africa must also include a detailed implementation action plan with a clear timeline, a detailed indication of the means and financial resources to be mobilized (including financial commitments by the Member States), an indication of the different levels of intervention (local, national, regional, pan-African) and their respective role, and an indication of a genuine joint monitoring mechanism to assess progress (involving the European Parliament and the African Union),

Principles and institutions

1. Stresses that the EU needs to develop a differentiated approach, distinguishing between cooperation partnerships in political, social and economic stability for well-performing States and partnerships towards such structural stability for fragile States;
2. Stresses that the EU should approach well-performing States as equal partners in a relationship based on full ownership, to enable them to maximise efforts in achieving the MDGs (e.g. through budget and sector support), and that fragile States must be approached in a relationship based on a level of ownership and using policy instruments compatible with the prevailing circumstances; notes that budget aid, especially in fragile states, must carefully be assessed case-by-case so as not to favour military expenditure, thus prolonging conflicts; wherever possible, the Commission and Member States should strive to move along the spectrum from project aid to sector-wide approaches, and from these to direct budget support;
3. Recognises that donor community efforts should complement the shift and impact of renewed African self-confidence manifested in the newly created institutions, the African Union (AU) and the regional bodies; reaffirms that political will, in donor countries as well as in Africa, is the key factor for reaching the MDG's;
4. Welcomes, in this respect, the 2004-2007 Strategic Plan of the Commission of the African Union, and urges the Commission to direct the actions proposed in its own strategy towards supporting financially, logistically, technically and in terms of human resources the institutions of the African Union and the initiatives and priorities worked out by them (such as NEPAD), rather than proposing new donor-driven initiatives and parallel structures;
5. Emphasises that an integrated EU strategy for Africa must also address the lack of coherence between other policy areas and development policy, and indicate how other policy areas can contribute (both in terms of policy setting and in terms of financing) to the implementation of the strategic development plan, aimed at poverty eradication, for the continent;
6. Welcomes the EU Member States commitment to the 0.7 target and encourages the Commission and Council to monitor efforts to achieve this target; further calls for a continued investigation into innovative sources of finance which could provide much needed funds beyond 0.7;

7. Stresses that addressing the lack of coherence should also include addressing issues such as export subsidies, tied aid, debt burden, export credits and commercial use of food aid ;
8. Calls for increased coordination of European aid, between national and EU-level strategies and actions, but also between Member States themselves, to avoid aid fragmentation and duplication, and to enable the EU to assume the global leadership role it ought to play in the fight against poverty;
9. Stresses the need for budgetisation of the European Development Fund, which would make for a better utilisation of funds and reduce the gap between commitment and payment appropriations;
10. Stresses, in this context, that the Commission must not position itself merely as the 26th EU aid donor; but must establish itself as a reference point for coordinating and ensuring the complementarity of aid, as part of a joint programme based on 'The European Consensus' and calls for intensified efforts, as a matter of priority, to identify the value-added of Community aid, and to identify EU donor leader(s) for specific thematic issues and partner countries;
11. Calls for the necessary mechanisms to be put in place in order to implement policies on coherence, coordination and complementarity that will enhance the effectiveness of EU development cooperation ;
12. Calls on the Commission to support fully the drive for harmonization amongst donors, according to the Paris Declaration of 2 March 2005 on Aid Effectiveness, Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment, Results and Mutual Accountability, which stresses that a very important part of the harmonization agenda consists in aligning donors' assistance firmly behind locally set priorities; stresses that delivering aid through local systems is part of improving the local institutions and making them accountable;
13. Welcomes the establishment of specific units within the AU secretariat that will be instrumental in speeding up and improving AU development policies and calls on the Commission to support their establishment and functioning;

Good governance and capacity building

14. Stresses the overall needs for capacity building, especially in the fields of administration, healthcare, education, economics and democratisation, in the public as well as in the private sector;
15. Stresses the prominent place which financial and technical support must have, in order to strengthen administration, accountability and transparency at local, national, regional and pan-African levels (including in the AU and its institutions);
16. Stresses that the construction of a functioning State must go hand in hand with support for civil society, in order to ensure the sustainability of democratisation; calls for particular attention to be given to the dialogue with religious communities and churches, considering their cultural importance in Africa;

17. Stresses that the construction of a functioning state respecting the rule of law must go hand in hand with support for civil society, in order to ensure the sustainability of the democratisation; calls for particular attention to be given to the dialogue with religious and ethnic communities, trade unions, local movements, non-governmental organisations, and international organisations;
18. Stresses that national parliaments and civil society organisations should play an important role in planning, prioritizing and scrutinizing development cooperation policy,
19. Emphasises that the guiding principles of the EU development strategy for Africa should be based on social and political dialogue determined by democratic values as enshrined in the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, without which no African sustainable development is possible.
20. Welcomes the aim of reinforcing the capacities of national and regional parliaments and stresses the role of the European Parliament (together with the Commission) in all EU initiatives to this effect;
21. Supports the principles of genuine partnership, ownership and policy dialogue; underlines that Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) of partner countries should be prepared by the countries themselves with close participation of democratically elected parliaments and civil society organisations;
22. Underlines the crucial role of women in agriculture, health care and education on the way towards achievement of sustainable development, stresses the need to involve women at all stages of not only development policy but in all political decision-making processes, including planning and assessment;
23. Recalls that respect for human rights by countries recipient of EU development funds is essential and urges EU actors involved in development assistance, while elaborating and monitoring projects funded or co-funded by the EU, to consider progress - or the lack of progress - made with regard to human rights by such countries;
24. Stresses the need for the EU to work for a democratisation of international institutions in order to achieve a stronger representation of developing countries' interests, and in particular the need to urge for democratisation of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization;

Social infrastructure

25. Emphasises that the availability and affordability of basic health care services is an absolute condition for the successful implementation of health policies in Africa; stresses therefore the need for national African health programmes to focus on basic healthcare (both curative and preventive), availability of safe water, sanitation and sexual and reproductive health; emphasizes the need for special efforts to assure access to basic services for the poorest and most vulnerable populations in Africa;
26. Welcomes the policy proposals of the new EU Programme for Action to confront HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria and calls for effective programme implementation

and adequate budget allocations; reminds the required cooperation with the organizations working towards these objectives, such as Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI), the Vaccine Fund and the Roll Back Malaria Partnership;

27. Stresses the important role of access to sexual and reproductive health in order to attain the MDGs on maternal health and child mortality;
28. Urges the Commission to ensure that the EU is at the forefront of efforts to ensure that basic education is free and compulsory; insists that this must be combined with substantial new resources and more targeted spending of existing resources;
29. Calls for increased and appropriate use of information and communication technology (ICT), to be used in innovative ways to extend health care to rural and remote areas, and to introduce e-education (as called for by NEPAD's e-Africa Commission) as an alternative to traditional education delivery systems in a bid to achieve qualitative education for all;
30. Stresses that alongside efforts in basic education, attention should be given to higher education, in order to ensure a sufficiently educated workforce in basic education and health services;
31. Stresses the need to protect the development and ensure the social protection of children as a basic feature of the development strategy for Africa, given that more than 50% of the population of Africa are children and points out that a significant factor in combating poverty in the long term is to invest through education in the human capital;
32. Stresses that the European Commission should spend at least 20 % of the development funds it allocates to Africa on basic health and basic education;
33. Stresses that the EU needs to implement concrete policies and programming addressed to reduce the spread of HIV-AIDS and its impact on children, their families and the communities they live in as the impact of HIV/AIDS threatens to undercut the development gains in most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa;
34. Calls on the Commission to support the initiative for an African Decade of Disabled Persons, which was adopted by the Organisation of African Unity during its 35th session, held in Algiers in July 1999;
35. Stresses the need, in order to break Africa's cycle of poverty, of an unprecedented level of investment in this generation of children and their survival, development and protection at the centre of policy and practice;
36. Considers that investing in girls' education is the most effective development strategy since educated girls generate smaller and healthier families, leading to increased productivity and poverty reduction;
37. Stresses the importance of the education of girls and women for improving health, including such aspects as sexual and reproductive health, and the prevention of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) such as HIV/AIDS, and diseases related to the water supply

and hygienic conditions such as tuberculosis, malaria, cholera and diarrhoea;

Economic growth

38. Urges that full account be taken of the fact that most African countries are heavily dependent on primary commodities, which are particularly vulnerable to price fluctuation and tariff escalation, and stresses the importance of diversification, the development of processing industries and small and medium-sized enterprises;
39. Underlines the importance of creating a stable and predictable investment climate – inter alia through respect for the law), for property rights and for rules concerning intellectual property – to achieve sufficient and sustained foreign financial inflows and thus create jobs, reduce the “brain drain” and create an environment conducive to stable economic growth; stresses the importance of micro-finance to build a strong middle class to sustain economic growth;
40. Believes, in order to reach a level of competitiveness which could make Africa a full partner in international trade, that a sustainable development strategy should be built to combat poverty in Africa, which takes into account the real needs of the population, based on economic integration within regions to stimulate growth by the creation and sustain of domestic and regional markets and exploiting economies of scale;
41. Emphasises the importance of tourism as a vehicle for economic and social development; calls for tourism to be fully integrated into EU development policy;
42. Stresses that a successful conclusion of the WTO Doha Round must contribute positively to developing countries, in particular in Africa; and believes that this includes applying Special and Differential Treatment to developing countries and abolishing all trade-distorting agricultural subsidies;
43. Asks the Commission to embrace a formula of differentiated reductions of tariffs in non-agricultural market access (NAMA) which takes full account of the need of developing countries in Africa to protect nascent industries, as necessary;
44. Agrees with the Commission's approach to infrastructure in the widest sense of the definition, including water, energy, ICT and transport; insists, however, that large investments in infrastructure must be systematically preceded by assessment studies on their contribution to economic development and poverty reduction and must be better balanced with the funds allocated to social infrastructure such as basic education and health;
45. Underlines that an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) as a development-centred tool for liberalisation has the potential to promote economic growth in Africa; in this context, calls on the Commission to address concerns with regard to the lack of accompanying measures for compensation for tariff losses, support for capacity-building, technical assistance and other supply-side constraints, the continuation of non-reciprocity in market access and, if necessary, the extension of the negotiation timetable; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to actually deliver figures on the financing of accompanying measures and to strengthen technical assistance to allow a better outcome;

46. Asks the Commission in the ambit of the negotiations of the EPAs and WTO to strengthen the technical assistance to ACP countries to allow a fair and transparent outcome; calls again for better technical and structural support for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in order to help them in their global market access;
47. Recalls, as established in the WTO Doha Declaration, in the Monterrey Consensus and the conclusions of the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development, that developing countries, especially African ones, should be provided with technical assistance aimed at building the institutional and regulatory capacity required to capture the benefits of international trade and preferential arrangements.
48. Welcomes the fact that for the Commission the recent GSP-reform must be targeted at those countries which need it the most and must encourage regional cooperation between developing countries by various means; GSP should offer alternatives matching what these countries are currently entitled to under the Cotonou Agreement in case the EPAs are not agreed;
49. Stresses that the EU should look for further possibilities in its trade and agricultural policies to give developing countries more chances to economic growth, and urges other countries to do likewise within the ongoing WTO negotiations, especially with regard to the least-developed countries;
50. Recognises the fact that a lack of coordination on the part of donors of their aid projects in individual countries will undermine the sustainability of aid programmes and negatively affect resource allocation and growth, and demands that the European Union and its Member states reduce the volatility of aid flows, which can result in financial instability and hinder macroeconomic development;
51. Welcomes the renewed commitment on granting 100% debt relief to 18 of the poorest and most heavily indebted countries made at the meeting of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and African Development Bank; calls for the expansion of debt relief commitments to those governments which respect human rights, the principle of good governance and prioritize poverty eradication on the basis of MDG-needs; stresses that all debt relief should be additional to increases in Official Development Assistance;
52. Expresses deep concern concerning the loss of value of commodities for producers and calls on the EU to look for the establishment of new mechanisms in order to establish a better balance in the chain of production, in particular better and more stable prices for the producers;
53. Underlines the positive role that Public Private Partnerships (PPP's) can play in development and in strengthening the problem-solving capacities of countries;

Peace and security

54. Calls on the Commission to develop a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention and reconstruction as an integral part of partnerships towards structural stability for fragile States;
55. Underlines the importance of regional bodies in providing a ground for maintaining a peaceful environment; emphasises the need for support to the regional bodies to establish a harmonised regulatory framework to fight the proliferation of light arms and landmines;
56. Agrees that the Africa Peace Facility needs to be strengthened and encourages other civilian mechanisms to contribute to conflict prevention, resolution and management in Africa, with increased, flexible and sustainable EU funding; emphasises that development policy is one of several tools for addressing the root causes of insecurity but that it should not be subordinated to security policy; notes, however, that all expenses from the Community's development cooperation budget and the European Development Fund must comply with the OECD/DAC criteria for eligibility as ODA;
57. Emphasises the importance of EU electoral observation missions in conflict prevention and in the promotion of democracy; calls on the Council and the Commission to increase the global European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) budget line with the view of intensifying support for the EU electoral observation missions, stresses that election observation mission conclusions must be duly reflected in the formulation of European External Policies;
58. Stresses the need for coherent regional and national strategies for disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and reinsertion (DDRR) to support the stabilisation of post-conflict situations;
59. Stresses that an integrated EU strategy for Africa represents a binding framework for a coherent policy of the European Union and its Member States; Takes the view that the application of Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement to a Partner State prevents any EU Member State from continuing to cooperate, in parallel, with that country's police, military or other security forces or from resuming cooperation before the measures concerned have run their course;

Environment/ natural resources

60. Underlines the need for increased EU efforts to tackle the enormous environmental challenges faced by many of the poor, who are often totally dependent on natural resources for their survival;
61. Welcomes, in this context, recent Commission commitments - long overdue - to go from word to deed in regard to environment mainstreaming, and to put strategies for the promotion of sustainable development high on its agenda;

Implementation

62. Requests the Commission to assort its Strategy for Africa with a detailed implementation

action plan with a clear timeline, a detailed indication of the means and financial resources to be mobilized (including financial commitments by the Member States), an indication of the different levels of intervention (local, national, regional, pan-African) and their respective role, and an indication of a genuine joint monitoring mechanism to assess progress (involving the European Parliament and the African Union);

63. Insists that this implementation plan must cover all of Africa, including north Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and South Africa, for which at present separate regulations and agreements exist (the MEDA Regulation, the Cotonou Agreement, and - for South Africa - the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement and the EPRD Regulation), and separate responsibilities at the level of the Commission, and requests the Commission to indicate how these will be coordinated and aligned in order to contribute to the implementation of the priorities set forward for the whole continent by the African Union;
64. Points out that the essence of the proposals contained in the Commission communication depends on the implementation of existing national and regional programmes, and regrets that in this respect no new proposals have been made to improve their implementation, or to adapt their goals and programming of actions to the new priorities, and that no review of the existing Country Strategy Papers and national and regional indicative programmes has been proposed as a consequence of this new strategy document and the new developments in Africa (particularly the creation of the African Union and its institutions);
65. Expresses disappointment at the lack of ambition of the proposed financial framework: the Commission only envisages the possibility of mobilizing increased financial resources for the "post-9th EDF period" and does not discuss the possibility of using debt relief as a means for mobilizing additional financial resources for the MDGs;
66. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments of the Member States, the African Union and the ACP.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

1. In its announced communication on an EU Strategy for Africa, the Commission wants to present a long-term EU Strategy for achieving the MDGs in Africa by 2015. The rapporteur fully supports this aim. Africa is the continent experiencing the most serious problems for achieving the MDGs. This is especially true for sub-Saharan Africa. For almost all MDGs, progress in Africa is inexistent or far too slow. The UNDP's 2005 Human Development Report shows a decline in living standards in much of sub-Saharan Africa. Especially these countries have little chance of achieving the MDGs and even economic power houses, such as South Africa, are rapidly losing steam because of the HIV/AIDS pandemic.

It is therefore clear that Africa, and particularly sub-Saharan Africa needs special attention from the international community and it is also clear that the EU needs a change of strategy in order to be more effective and to reach the MDGs. We need a MDG-focused strategy with more resources and innovative policies.

2. Parliament welcomes the May 2005 GAERC decision to increase the volume of EU official development aid (ODA), in order to reach 0.7% of GNI by 2015, with an intermediate target of 0.56% by 2010. The EP equally welcomes the fact that the Council will dedicate collectively at least 50% of the agreed ODA increase to the continent and will accelerate aid to sub-Saharan Africa.

3. But more money alone will not lead to development. Budget increases must go hand in hand with improved quality of aid, which should be an answer to the causes of poverty. In order to be effective, a strategy for Africa must take as its starting point the real situation in countries and must take as its central objective poverty reduction through the MDGs. In line with the Commission, the EP recognizes that - although in the last decade progress has been achieved in many countries, *structural instability* still plagues the continent. In many African countries weak governments and administrations cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of their people, including the poor. There is a lack of the most important functions of the state for poverty reduction such as territorial control, safety and security, capacity to manage public resources, delivery of basic services, the ability to protect and support the poorest people in the way they sustain themselves. In the context of the world economy, most national or regional African economies are very frail and heavily dependent on external influences, making long-term planning - an indispensable precondition for sustainable development - almost impossible.

4. The Commission rightly observes that the political situation differs considerably between African countries and regions. It states that its proposed strategy seeks to be Africa-wide and to cover the EU's relations with the entire continent. It seems to hinge its strategy on working with stable countries, which - although it recognizes that not all stable countries provide examples of good or effective governance - should play an essential role in stabilising their regions and providing examples of what can be achieved in a favourable political climate.

5. For the rapporteur, here is an inherent contradiction: stability is of course necessary, but stability without good government will sooner or later lead to social unrest, economic

stagnation and eventually *instability*. *Structural* stability - as opposed to temporary stability - is built on good governance. Stability in itself is no guarantee for social justice and economic growth. Neither is it a sufficient basis for building a strategy for sustainable development. Practice in Africa has shown that even well governed countries with a relatively well performing economy remain often very fragile. Situations can change very rapidly: compare Ivory Coast before 2002 and now.

The concept of working with *structurally stable* states must be supported, but equally important is to work with *fragile states*, where the state has failed or countries in conflict or coming out of it, such as Burundi. We must avoid that these countries lapse into a *vicious circle* of poverty and violence, that they destabilise their neighbours, create refugee flows, spread disease and become bases for terrorists. A uniform "*one size fits all*" strategy, applicable "*from Cairo to the Cape*" and based mainly on working with good performers, such as the Commission proposes, has already in the past proven not to lead to the desired results.

"Since the mid-1990s, a stronger donor emphasis on rewarding countries with relatively effective governments and stable macroeconomic policies has led to further neglect of fragile states (...) Fragile states have received 43% less aid than would have been appropriate given the extent of poverty within them. Aid that has been given has often been delivered badly. It has been more volatile, more fragmented and poorly coordinated. The MDGs cannot be achieved without more progress in fragile states." (from the January 2005 DfID policy paper "*Why we need to work more effectively in fragile states*".)

6. Any strategy for Africa's development must therefore build upon the notion of a *dual* partnership, which takes account of these very different situations and needs. The rapporteur supports the view of Jeffrey Sachs:

- For *structurally stable* countries with a representative and transparent government and a reasonably competent administration, using the revenues of the economy for supplying basic services to the entire population, Sachs proposes in "*Ending Africa's Poverty Trap*" that "a substantial increase in official development assistance be offered to enable them to achieve the MDGs by 2015. These are a useful intermediate target for breaking Africa's poverty trap, since they address the key sectors in which major productivity improvements are both needed and achievable". "This will require a comprehensive strategy for public investment in conjunction with improved governance." For countries "where domestic governance is adequate, aid processes should be guided by a number of core principles. First, policies should be aligned with the 2015 time horizon (...) Second, the public investment program needs to be guided by bottom-up assessments of *needs* (...) Third, donor assistance needs to be harmonized and coordinated around budget support, particularly in countries where governance structures are not the limiting factor to accelerate progress towards the MDGs". This is the traditional partnership for development cooperation with stable countries.
- "In countries which do not enjoy structural stability, where governance is weak, the preceding framework will not apply," says Sachs. "Mainly because development aid allocated to poorly functioning governments can easily be squandered or even used to reinforce bad practices. The key is to understand the nature of the poor governance, and to take actions that make sense in the context (...). When the problem is violent conflict, the

role of aid needs to be focused in the first instance on peace making, peace keeping, and humanitarian assistance. When the problem is entrenched despotic rule, large scale aid transfers to the government are ill advised; aid to such governments should be limited, and aid should be substantially allocated through NGOs and international agencies rather than through the central government.”

7. Hence, for most African countries the European strategy must aim, before anything else, at achieving structural stability. As long as this is not the case, the strategy for Africa must concentrate on the construction of a partnership *towards* structural stability, which, for the countries concerned, must *precede* the classical cooperation partnership *in* stability. The authorities of these countries have themselves an important responsibility in shaping the cooperation programmes, by working actively towards a context in which sustainable and structural cooperation becomes possible, and where all available cooperation instruments can be used.

As a rule, in fragile states financial injections in government budgets must be avoided, because of the high risk of "*fungibility*". Budget support in fragile states can have the effect that by supporting the state budget, more resources become available for the rulers to continue their military or repressive efforts. Unsuitable forms of aid may lead to the continuation of conflicts instead of helping to end them.

Therefore, the *policy mix* to apply must clearly and unambiguously be serving poverty reduction in line with the MDGs. All policy areas (e.g. diplomacy, migration policy, security and security sector reform, trade, agriculture and fisheries) can contribute to a speedier and more efficient attainment of this main objective. This report does not deal in detail with the crucial role of EU policies such as trade, Common Agricultural and Fisheries Policies. The report however stresses the importance of coherence of EU policies. Too often EU policies are contradictory and even counterproductive to the objectives of our development policy, as called for by Article 178 of the EC Treaty. The Commission's strategy for Africa should explicitly address this.

8. Our strategy and policy dialogue with our African partners should be based on:

- The principle of "*ownership*" as an essential condition for setting up a strategic cooperation relation with the countries and regions of Africa. The EU has a supporting and stimulating role, but cannot put itself in the place of the African institutions that must assume responsibility on the ground and acquire legitimacy in their own community. *Ownership* and *partnership* are perfectly compatible and should be reconciled with each other in a mature and responsible policy dialogue. In a *partnership*, each of the partners is responsible and accountable towards its own constituency (the population of the partner country, c.q. the European taxpayer). Both of them have a right to determine priorities and modalities for the use of the finances they donate or receive. It is therefore perfectly possible – as many donors do – to enter into a policy dialogue on the basis of a limited set of EU priorities, without infringing the principle of *ownership* by the partner. The EU has not only the right, but also the duty to clearly define and announce priorities for its cooperation with Africa. Our development partners have a right to know what they can expect from us, and for what they should turn to other donors. It is therefore difficult to accept the Commission's argument that deconcentration and devolution of responsibilities to the delegations only allow for priority setting at country level;

- Policy decisions should not only be based on macroeconomic indications or strategic geopolitical agendas of the donors, but must in the first place be taken in function of the needs and the requirements to achieve poverty reduction and in function of the absorption capacity and the guarantees for responsible management of aid flows by the recipient country;
- A clear willingness to help in *all* circumstances. The modalities of our aid, however, will be determined by the circumstances prevailing in our partner countries or regions. The Commission, in a proactive way, must clarify the circumstances and conditions for the use of each of the available aid instruments. The Commission must assess the use of each of these instruments and their effect on poverty reduction in partner countries. Only with a good and independent evaluation (and audit) of our instruments and actions will we be able to adapt ourselves in a flexible, adequate and more effective way to changing circumstances in our partner countries.
This is different from the “*stop and go*” development cooperation, which is often a corollary of classical conditionality (for stable countries all possible aid instruments are made available; however, as soon as problems of governance, corruption or human rights appear, donors often react by closing off *all* aid), which would prevent sustainability and long term planning;
- In any case, as the Commission itself proposes, aid programmes for Africa must also be geared towards the construction of a reasonably functioning government apparatus – taking simultaneously into account that in many cases this apparatus does not exist at this moment. The construction of a functioning state must go hand in hand with support for civil society, in order to ensure the sustainability of the democratisation and institution building process. Therefore, dialogue with civil society, including religious communities and churches, must be deepened – with, certainly in Africa, particular attention to the role of women;
- Priority sectors for Community cooperation with Africa must be determined in function of their possible impact on poverty reduction. The rapporteur suggests that emphasis be put on good governance, capacity building, social infrastructure (especially education and health) economic growth, peace and stability and environment/natural resources;
- The rapporteur stresses the need for coordination and leadership in the different policy areas, regions and countries, both between Member States and the Commission and between Member States themselves. Besides, the Commission should continuously search for its *added value* in comparison to the Member States and other major donors.
- In order to be effective, the Commission must organize and manage its aid delivery machine (mainly DG DEV and AIDCO) in an efficient way around a limited set of EU priorities.

12.10.2005

OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE

for the Committee on Development

on a development strategy for Africa
(2005/2142(INI))

Draftsman: Johan Van Hecke

SUGGESTIONS

The Committee on International Trade calls on the Committee on Development, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:

1. Recognises that a greater involvement in international trade is a vital part of a development strategy for Africa, particularly as regards the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals, taking into account specific regional characteristics; however, points out that evidence from, inter alia, the United Nations Development Programme suggests that measures designed to increase the global competitiveness of African economies, such as structural adjustment programmes, privatisation of public enterprises and liberalisation of markets, have frequently exacerbated poverty in Africa;
2. Believes, in order to reach a level of competitiveness which could make Africa a full partner in international trade, that further multilateral trade rule-making, market opening, abolishing export subsidies, the integration of developing countries in a fair world trade system, starting with regional market cooperation and the improvement of the functioning of the WTO, remain primary objectives of EU trade policy in order to combat poverty in Africa in such a way as to take into account the real needs of the population, on the basis of the rebuilding of domestic and regional markets; and calls on the Commission to allow Special and Differential treatment and market protection for the least developed countries (LDCs);
3. Asks the Commission in the ambit of the WTO negotiations to follow an ambitious agenda to include boosting agricultural market access, to eliminate all forms of export subsidies and trade-distorting domestic support as soon as possible, and to support African countries with a strategy to protect their agriculture up to the point of self-

sufficiency, in order to guarantee a decent income for small farmers, increase local production, guarantee food security and proceed to selective market openings, as it has been the case in Europe;

4. Asks the Commission to embrace a formula of differentiated reductions of tariffs in non-agricultural market access (NAMA) which takes full account of the need of developing countries in Africa to protect nascent industries, as necessary;
5. Asks the Commission to use its influence to cancel the debts of more African countries, which is essential to their regional economic development;
6. Asks the Commission to speed up negotiations on services, as a further, well-regulated liberalisation of trade in services will also benefit Africa; calls on the Commission to exempt essential services, such as education, water, health, and energy;
7. Welcomes the fact that for the Commission the recent GSP-reform must be targeted at those countries which need it the most and must encourage regional cooperation between developing countries by various means; GSP should offer alternatives matching what these countries are currently entitled to under the Cotonou Agreement in case the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) are not agreed;
8. Asks the Commission in the ambit of the negotiations of the EPAs and WTO to strengthen the technical assistance to ACP countries to allow a fair and transparent outcome; calls again for better technical and structural support for LDCs in order to help them in their global market access;
9. Recalls, as established in the WTO Doha Declaration, in the Monterrey Consensus and the conclusions of the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development, that developing countries, especially African ones, should be provided with technical assistance aimed at building the institutional and regulatory capacity required to capture the benefits of international trade and preferential arrangements.
10. Calls on the countries of the EU and Africa to assess the current trade liberalisation policy and its impact on poverty eradication in Africa in terms of job creation, access to health services, access to education, environmental protection, and the generation of taxable income;
11. Calls on the Commission and the EU Member States to address the urgent problem of falling commodity prices, to offer participation in the financing of the International Task Force on Commodities proposed by UNCTAD, and to support the proposal for immediate action by six African Governments whose countries are dependent on commodities, which was submitted to WTO on 16 June 2005;
12. Asks the Commission to ensure that EPAs are instruments for ACP development and poverty eradication, inter alia through the continuation of non-reciprocity in market access, a focus on supply-side constraints and safeguards for sensitive products, and the strengthening of existing regional integration efforts.

PROCEDURE

Title	A development strategy for Africa
Procedure number	2005/2142(INI)
Committee responsible	DEVE
Committee asked for its opinion Date announced in plenary	INTA 8.9.2005
Enhanced cooperation	No
Draftsman Date appointed	Johan Van Hecke 30.8.2005
Discussed in committee	12.9.2005
Date suggestions adopted	11.10.2005
Result of final vote	for: 20 against: 4 abstentions: 0
Members present for the final vote	Jean-Pierre Audy, Enrique Barón Crespo, Jean-Louis Bourlanges, Nigel Farage, Béla Glattfelder, Jacky Henin, Alain Lipietz, Erika Mann, Helmuth Markov, David Martin, Javier Moreno Sánchez, Georgios Papastamkos, Tokia Saïfi, Peter Šťastný, Robert Sturdy, Johan Van Hecke, Zbigniew Zaleski,
Substitutes present for the final vote	Panagiotis Beglitis, Danutė Budreikaitė, Elisa Ferreira, Jörg Leichtfried, Antolín Sánchez Presedo, Mauro Zani
Substitutes under Rule 178(2) present for the final vote	Syed Kamall

25.10.2005

OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

for the Committee on Development

on a development strategy for Africa
(2005/2142(INI))

Draftsman: Tobias Pflüger

SUGGESTIONS

The Committee on Foreign Affairs calls on the Committee on Development, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:

1. Welcomes the progress which has been made in recent decades, including the triumph of democracy over tyranny, colonialism and apartheid in countries such as Nigeria, Namibia and South Africa, which shows that fundamental change depends on the popular will;
2. Recommends a debate on the causes of poverty as well as the consequences resulting from it;
3. Calls for a new effort to combat poverty and social exclusion in Africa, with improved coordination and complementarity of Member States' and Commission policies and adequate resources for poverty reduction in the EU budget, bearing in mind creative solutions to fight poverty (such as micro-financing) and also the work of UN agencies and programmes;
4. Calls on the EU to respect basic human rights when dealing with refugees and illegal immigrants on the EU's border in Africa, and to consider the option of organising an international conference on migration;
5. Calls upon the EU steadfastly to support the UN in its efforts to accomplish the decolonisation of Western Sahara, and for increased EU humanitarian aid for Sahrawi refugees;
6. Recommends the initiation of a debate on governmental and corporate social responsibility as an integral part of the new Africa strategy;
7. Underlines the importance of providing an optimum level of public services, and calls for a renewed focus on basic services in health, education and welfare;
8. Calls for the reversal of proposed cuts in EU funding for work on HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis and other health sector initiatives involving Africa;

9. Stresses that the EU's strategy in Africa must not reinforce undemocratic regimes; calls therefore for concerted efforts to channel the increased development assistance effectively in order to stabilise the respective recipient countries; reiterates the need for a tailor-made development strategy that responds to the special needs of the respective country and that differentiates between structurally stable states and failing states;
10. Calls on the EU to assume a leading role in the implementation of the new universally accepted responsibility to protect, by improving peacemaking capacities, in support of the African Union, and by strengthening the fight against impunity through renewed support for the ICC and other international criminal tribunals;
11. Stresses the importance of ensuring that human rights and democracy are respected in Africa and calls on the EU to increase its support for democratic institutions, in particular national parliaments, and to strengthen the role of the European electoral observation missions and duly reflect their conclusions on European external policies;
12. Stresses the need to promote peace and the resolution of African conflicts by ensuring a strict control of arms exports, under a binding international arms trade treaty, more efficient demobilisation programmes, in particular regarding child soldiers, and de-mining assistance;
13. Calls on the EU to continue and further strengthen its cooperation with the African Union, and welcomes the inclusion of a chapter on Africa in the outcome document of the 60th UN World Summit, highlighting the importance of that continent's development.

PROCEDURE

Title	A Development Strategy for Africa
Procedure number	2005/2142(INI)
Committee responsible	DEVE
Committee asked for its opinion Date announced in plenary	AFET 8.9.2005
Enhanced cooperation	No
Draftsman Date appointed	Tobias Pflüger 20.9.2005
Discussed in committee	11.10.2005 24.10.2005
Date suggestions adopted	24.10.2005
Result of final vote	for: 37 against: 0 abstentions: 0
Members present for the final vote	Vittorio Agnoletto, Philip Claeys, Simon Coveney, Ryszard Czarnecki, Anna Elzbieta Fotyga, Jas Gawronski, Maciej Marian Giertych, Ana Maria Gomes, Alfred Gomolka, Anna Ibrisagic, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Georgios Karatzaferis, Ioannis Kasoulides, Francisco José Millán Mon, Pasqualina Napoletano, Annemie Neyts-Uyttebroeck, Tobias Pflüger, Mirosław Mariusz Piotrowski, Bernd Posselt, José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra, György Schöpflin, Gitte Seeberg, Antonio Tajani, Charles Tannock, Geoffrey Van Orden, Ari Vatanen, Francis Wurtz, Josef Zieleniec.
Substitutes present for the final vote	Marielle De Sarnez, Árpád Duka-Zólyomi, Glyn Ford, Kinga Gál, Milan Horáček, Alexander Lambsdorff, Erik Meijer, Aloyzas Sakalas
Substitutes under Rule 178(2) present for the final vote	Johan Van Hecke

