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Contribution by EU High Representative JAVIER SOLANA to the EU Strategy for Africa

EU Ministers today (21 November 2005) discussed the EU Strategy for Africa which is to be adopted at the European Summit in December. The strategy will be based on two documents, a paper by HR Javier Solana, which focuses on peace and security, and a communication by the Commission, entitled "EU Strategy for Africa: towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Africa's development", dated 12 October 2005.

The document below is HR Solana's paper of 27 October 2005. It concerns the peace and security aspects of the global strategy for Africa and the contribution that the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) can make.

We need a long-term global strategy for Africa. There is a new awareness that development, peace and security and human rights are closely linked.

It is in our strategic interest that the situation in Africa improves. The main challenges that we will face over the coming 15 years - migration, political Islam, terrorism - will also have to be addressed in Africa.

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Introduction

Our interest is that Africa develops into a stable and prosperous continent. This is still far from being the case. Corrupt government and politics and security problems have stood too often in the way. But things are changing. Much has already been done in this regard in Africa itself, under the influence of a new generation of African statesmen. The creation of the African Union, incorporating the NEPAD programme could be a sign of an African renaissance. The results are promising: democratic progress, civil societies springing to life, a relative stabilisation of the continent. All this is not enough and should be strengthened and deepened.

A number of recent policy documents have dealt with African problems in a comprehensive manner. Building on these, this paper suggests ways of improving the EU's policy on Africa, based on the instruments currently at our disposal. It proposes ways we can enhance our contribution.

This paper should be read in conjunction with the Commission Communication. Its emphasis is on peace and security aspects and on the contribution the CFSP/ESDP can bring to the overall EU strategy.

A review of strategy is appropriate, for the following reasons:

- **The shortcomings and failures of past policies** (doubling of people living on less than one euro, conflicts and chronic instability in some parts of the continent);
- **The new awareness of a close link between development, peace and security and human rights** (European Security Strategy and the 2005 World Summit Outcome);
- **Encouraging signals coming out of Africa** (the creation of AU shows a determination by Africans to tackle Africa's problem);
- **Changes within the EU** (the development of the CFSP and ESDP offers the possibility of developing a comprehensive approach);
- **The financial commitments** by the developed world mean more funds available for Africa.
- **The major challenges** that the EU will meet over the next 10-15 years - migration, energy, political Islam, terrorism and climate change - also need to be addressed in Africa.

Principles for a successful strategy

Past experience with Africa includes many failures. Aid needs the right environment and must be geared towards helping countries develop themselves. It also needs a long term commitment. Past experience and an assessment of today's needs suggest that a successful strategy for Africa might build on the following principles:

- **Comprehensiveness:** There is no unique solution for Africa's problems. Often, the objectives of development, peace and security, good governance and human rights have been pursued along parallel tracks. But as Kofi Annan sets out *"we will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security without development, and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights."* This means that measures in the field of trade, aid, debt relief will need to be supported by peace and security, and governance.

- **Coherence:** Within the EU we need more coherence between the different pillars. This also includes the need to align the new Strategy for Africa with the Barcelona Process, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the Cotonou Agreement and the Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) with South Africa and identify avenues to better support continental initiatives (AU) with the instruments already in place. There should also be more coherence between what the EU does and the actions of its Member States (bilaterally as well as in multilateral fora, i.e. the UN and the IFIs). Recent experiences with EU involvement in Africa have shown that when the EU speaks with one voice, it can have an impact. EUSRs are contributing to this.
EU policy towards Africa should be solidly based on UN principles and we should aim for a trilateral partnership - EU, UN, AU - in Africa. The UN Peace Building Commission will become an important tool in that respect. Finally, we should seek more coherence with other donors, important partners in Africa and new emerging powers like China.
- **Partnership/Responsibility:** The strategy should be implemented in consultation with African partners. Reform has to be carried out by Africans themselves. Assistance achieves results only when matched by the respective political will and genuine efforts of our African partners. Partnership presupposes shared responsibility, mutual accountability and ownership on both sides to achieve goals identified and agreed in common. True partnership also means going beyond the mechanics of the Cotonou agreement and deepening our dialogue at all levels. A functioning partnership also has to be built on functioning states. There is a need to reward good performers but taking into account the specific situation of failed or fragile states emerging from conflict.
- **Regional approach:** The EU should adopt a regional approach to conflicts in Africa. We are doing so in the Great Lakes region; we developed a West Africa strategy but implementation is lagging behind. Sudan should also be seen in a regional context. DR Congo and the Sudan are actually the two main theatres for EU action where the EU seeks, not without success, to make a difference. Without stabilisation of both the DR Congo and the Sudan, Africa as a whole will not meet the Millennium Development Goals.
- **Inclusiveness:** Development and security both require the participation of a vibrant civil society. The EU should invest more in education, the role of women, NGOs etc. Questions of inequality, how to prevent exclusion as well as reduce absolute levels of poverty should be addressed as contributions to conflict prevention.

Policies

These translate into three major clusters of action:

Building security

To create the conditions for development and democracy we need to meet the challenges of peace and security in Africa. This means that ESDP is one of the key instruments the EU has at its disposal for Africa policy. It needs to be resourced accordingly.

So far we have undertaken four ESDP activities in Africa:

- ARTEMIS. An EU autonomous operation (with France acting as a framework nation) was able to maintain peace in an area of the Eastern DR Congo during the period when the UN was not yet able to deploy. It may have prevented serious bloodshed; it certainly saved the Congo peace process from falling apart.

- EUPOL/EUSEC. The EU is engaged in the security sector in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Although our contribution is small, our presence on the ground has given us an influential role.
- AMIS. The EU is providing funding, logistic and planning support to enable the AU deployment in Darfur. It is also contributing to the reinforcement of the CIVPOL chain of command.

Each of these deployments points to certain lessons:

- As ARTEMIS showed, the EU needs to be prepared occasionally to respond directly to crises when there is no-one else who can or will intervene. The battle groups concept responds to this, focusing on time-limited operations with an exit strategy.
- EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC demonstrate the impact that small deployments can have on critical elements in a situation. They also demonstrate the lack of resources that the EU is able to bring to bear on situations where we can actually make a difference.
- These two operations also illustrate the importance of integrated security sector reform and disarmament, demobilisation and reconstruction concepts. For sustainable ESDP missions, civil and military initiatives need to be better linked to the EU's longer term conflict prevention and development programmes and vice-versa. We should develop integrated military and civilian SSR teams, including the full spectrum of necessary competencies.
- AMIS demonstrates the importance of the Africa Peace Facility (APF). We need to consider increasing funding for African peace support activities but also to put the APF on a longer-term sustainable basis. At the same time we should find ways of using the APF that give us more influence. In the case of AMIS, others, who provided less, have had more impact on the agenda e.g. AMIS enlargement. EU should be able to make sure that funding crisis management operations goes hand in hand with a convincing political process and a real EU/AU partnership. APF implementation needs to be combined more effectively with police and military expertise and not lastly political oversight.
- A second lesson from AMIS has been the challenge of working with an organisation as the African Union that is only in the beginning of its capacity building process. We should therefore put capacity building in the AU and sub-regional organisations, at the heart of our policies in Africa. This should include both military and civil capacity building and decision making, mediation, early warning and planning in Headquarters.
- We need better tools and increased financial resources for ESDP support to African partners (either regional/sub-regional organisations or States). The various financing options for ESDP/CFSP looked at in the ongoing discussion for the next year and for the next Financial Perspective (substantial increase of the CFSP budget, Member State financing through amendment of the Athena mechanism etc) apply also to EU action on peace and security in Africa. We need to improve through the implementation of concrete projects. In practical terms we should in particular develop our supporting and co-ordination structure to (i) organise and conduct training activities both for long term capacity building and to respond to immediate and urgent needs (such as pre-deployment training similar to the MAPEX exercise organised for the AU), (ii) support education course for military experts and (iii) manage other concrete projects in the field of defence reform.

- It would make sense for the EU and the Member States to work together on a broad training agenda covering both military and civilian aspects (including activities from e.g. the G8, Africa Partnership Forum and UN in this field). The recourse to operators to develop and conduct activities (building for instance on the proposal made by France to "Europeanise" RECAMP) should be considered in that framework. The development of an African standby force creates the opportunity to take this forward. Our resources for Africa remain limited compared with the scale of the problems; it is therefore doubly important that they be brought together sensibly.

Building governance

Security problems are a manifestation of underlying political problems. Solutions to these can be found through:

- *External pressure and mediation.* The EU can act in support of the AU and the sub-regional organisations or the UN.
- *Democracy.* The high reputation of the EU electoral observation is well deserved. We should be ready to allocate more resources to it, but also to build indigenous capacity. A genuine democratic process however requires more than regular elections. EU support should encourage a transparent and inclusive approach by elected governments, to avoid elections fostering divisions or the consolidation of vested interests. The EU should thus extend its involvement beyond elections, contributing to the elaboration of regulatory frameworks adapted to country situations and the training of political personnel and civil society to enhance governmental accountability.
- *Economic governance.* Accountability is also linked to the issue of corruption and the transparency of budgets. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) will become an important instrument for improving democracy and governance. Specific support to good governance in post-conflict situations should be enhanced. Furthermore, the EU should be at the forefront in ratifying the UN convention against corruption.
- *Human rights.* Experience shows that strengthening human rights is particularly crucial in societies emerging from conflict situations and for the prevention of conflict. The EU should support democratisation processes, gender mainstreaming and other human rights projects. Strengthening African regional mechanisms for protection of human rights defenders and addressing the issue of children affected by armed conflict are two major areas of cooperation.
- *Migration.* Both the EU and the AU have identified migration as a key area of interest. There is a need for better understanding and better practical cooperation with Africa on migration issues, including legal and extra-legal migratory movements. Migration can be to the benefit or detriment of development in countries of origin in Africa. Issues which need to be explored include ensuring that the root causes of migration are addressed, combating trafficking in human beings, building capacity in the area of migration management, and harnessing the potential of the diaspora communities. EU policy should help address the push factors and contribute to the positive synergy between migration and development.
- *Conflict resources.* Insecurity and armed conflict are often linked to the mismanagement or the illegal exploitation of natural resources. The Kimberly process and the EU action plan for Forest law Enforcement Government and Trade show the way. So do the principles in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. Their application should be enlarged to

other vulnerable sectors such as timber; specific attention will need to go to water as a conflict resource. Regulatory mechanisms will function only when we also build the necessary African capacity to manage and monitor them.

- *Small arms and light weapons (SALW)*. The European Council intends to adopt in December a worldwide strategy to combat illicit accumulation of SALW and their ammunition. Regarding Africa, it focuses on supporting regional initiatives to combat the illicit trade in SALW. The EU will have to focus also on export of SALW to Africa from producing sStates. In this context we should promote the EU rules of arms exports as an international standard, both bilaterally and through the envisaged UN Arms Trade Treaty, and support the incorporation of minimum common standards of transfer controls into a strengthened UN Programme of Action. We should develop mechanisms to exploit better the information we have on illegal trafficking and consider the possibility of restrictive measures to discourage transfer.
- *Terrorism*. African countries often lack the expertise and resources to adequately fulfil their international counter-terrorism obligations. In some African countries reform of the security sector is particularly important to enable governments to fight terrorism effectively. The EU is ready to engage with African partners and provide them with technical assistance aimed at enhancing their counter-terrorism capacities and legislation. It will also support the AU Centre for the study on terrorism in Algiers. The EU will continue to address the factors underlying radicalisation and the emergence of a support base for terrorism.

Building partnership

These policies make sense only if pursued in the closest cooperation with African partners at all levels. Political dialogue is the first and possibly the most important tool to prevent crises and solve conflicts.

- The EU-Africa dialogue needs to be broadened and invigorated. In this context, the organisation of a second EU-Africa Summit should remain a priority for the EU.
- We need a more regular, in-depth dialogue with the AU. A Brussels-based EU/AU steering mechanism at working level would be a useful vehicle for this; HoMs in Addis Ababa need to play a similar role at their end. However, if the EU/AU relationship keeps strengthening, revision of the EU/ACP framework and the Barcelona process will be needed to take account of the Pan-African dimension.
- Dialogue with sub-regional organisations (SADC and ECOWAS) is well established. We should enlarge this to cover other organisations (IGAD, CEMAC/ECCAS and UMA).
- Better monitoring and reporting is needed from African countries if we are to act in time. EU HoMs should be invited to conduct a more structured dialogue under Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement and to report more regularly on important themes: governance, human rights and further areas to be defined in the specific context. The objective should be to better define EU policy responses.
- We should look at the way in which Article 96 consultations under the Cotonou Agreement are used. There would be advantage in developing such consultations *before* things have gone wrong (as foreseen in the revised Agreement) and perhaps through creating some link with the APRM.